Feasibility Study Company Independent Feasibility Analysis

Retail · Asset Class

Retail Feasibility & Market Studies

Independent, lender-grade analysis for retail real estate across conventional bank, CMBS, life-company, SBA, USDA, and bridge capital. This page is our standing read on why open-air retail is supply-starved while department-store-anchored malls stay distressed, how tenancy and lease-up forecasts fail review, and the difference between the market study, the feasibility study, and the appraisal a lender requires.

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4.8%
Overall retail availability, a record low1
0.5%
Annual completions as a share of inventory, 2009–20245
96.4%
Kimco pro-rata leased occupancy, an all-time record12
16.6%
E-commerce share of retail sales, Q4 202511
The Retail Thesis

One national retail number hides two markets.

Retail is the commercial asset class lenders underwrite on tenant credit, lease structure, and rollover risk rather than on bricks alone, and, critically, multi-tenant retail is valued as income-producing real estate, not as a going concern. That single distinction separates it from the gas-station, car-wash, and senior-housing assets underwritten as operating businesses: here the rent roll is the analysis. Contract rent versus market rent, weighted-average lease term, anchor credit and co-tenancy, and the cost to re-tenant drive value. We prepare the market study, the feasibility study, and the appraisal input a retail file needs, aligned to the standard that will judge it.

The market itself is defined by a bifurcation. On one side, open-air retail is supply-starved: the United States has seen almost no net new construction for over a decade, with annual completions averaging just 0.5 percent of inventory from 2009 through 2024, the lowest of the major property types, and overall availability fell to a record-low 4.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2025.51 Necessity and grocery-anchored formats are thriving; Kimco Realty reported an all-time-record 96.4 percent pro-rata leased occupancy at year-end 2025 and a 29.0 percent cash spread on new leases, while Regency Centers grew same-property NOI 4.7 percent and Brixmor posted record small-shop occupancy.1213 On the other side, department-store-anchored malls remain split: Class A malls sit near pre-pandemic productivity, with Simon Property Group reporting 96.4 percent occupancy and $799-per-square-foot reported sales, while Class B and C malls face secular decline and redevelopment, the path Macerich is taking as it demolishes dead department stores and adds grocery anchors.212223 A single national retail number blends the two into noise.

The 2024–2026 bankruptcy and store-closure wave was real but was a reshuffle, not a collapse: Coresight Research counted 8,270 US store closures in 2025 against 5,270 openings, below 2024's revised 8,825 and far below its own original 15,000 projection, even as US corporate bankruptcy filings reached a fifteen-year high.89 Discounters, off-price, grocery, and food service, led by Dollar General, Aldi, Burlington, TJX, and Ross, backfilled space at the fastest pace in nearly fifteen years.10 E-commerce, meanwhile, has matured rather than exploded, settling at 16.6 percent of retail sales in the fourth quarter of 2025, with physical stores increasingly serving as omnichannel fulfillment nodes.11 What follows is organized as a working desk: a national and metro supply and absorption monitor, the tenancy and lease-up failure forensics that sink retail studies, the capital-source routing that decides which deliverable a project needs, and the study-type distinctions competitors state loosely. Every figure is dated and attributed in the sources below.

The Supply & Absorption Monitor

Where the retail market stands, market by market.

A supply-pressure read for the major US retail markets, compiled from named primary sources. Sorted from tightest to softest. Data current through the first quarter of 2026; availability and vacancy are reported on different bases and are labeled per cell.

The national picture frames every metro. New retail construction has effectively stopped: annual completions averaged just 0.5 percent of inventory from 2009 through 2024, the lowest of the major property types, and CBRE recorded only 4.5 million square feet delivered in the first quarter of 2025 against a ten-year quarterly average of 11.9 million.51 JLL put first-quarter 2026 deliveries at 7.8 million square feet, twenty-five percent below the ten-year average, with the active pipeline under 0.3 percent of existing inventory.64 The cause is arithmetic, not sentiment: construction cost exceeds the rent new development can achieve, so it is cheaper to lease existing space than to build.6 Demand is positive but supply-constrained, with CBRE reporting 11.3 million square feet of net absorption in the fourth quarter of 2025, punctuated by a now-recognized “Q1 hangover,” with negative first-quarter absorption in 2024, 2025, and 2026 driven by planned closures.14 Beneath the national line the segments have diverged: neighborhood and strip availability hit a record-low 6.7 percent in mid-2025 even as power-center net absorption briefly turned negative on big-box bankruptcies.2 The result is a market with almost no vacancy to give and a widening split between thriving open-air formats and distressed department-store-anchored malls.

Supply pressure: Tight Balanced Softer. Availability (CBRE basis) and vacancy (C&W shopping-center basis) are different rulers and are not netted; rent is asking unless noted.
Metro Vacancy / availability Rent trend Supply pipeline Supply pressure
Miami–Dade3.0% vacancyC&W, Q1 2026Rising, tourism-supportedVery limitedTight
Raleigh–Durham3.4% vacancyC&W, Q1 2026~7.5% YoY, fastest of large markets~0.5% of stock deliveredTight
Nashville3.5–3.7% vacancyC&W / Matthews, Q4 2025~$30/sq ft; +35% over 5 yrsSlowed sharply in 2025Tight
Salt Lake City3.4% vacancyC&W, Q1 2026PositiveLimitedTight
Charleston3.9% vacancyC&W, Q1 2026PositiveLimitedTight
Charlotte~4.7-mo lease timeTenantBase, 2026StrongLimitedTight
TampaTightening fastC&W / TenantBase~4.7% YoYConstrainedTight
PhoenixLow; balancedCBRERobust Sun Belt gains~0.8% of stock under constructionTight
Boston<4.0% vacancyC&W, Q3 2025PositiveVery limitedTight
New York (Manhattan)1.2M sq ft leased Q1 2026C&WStable high-streetVery limitedTightThin at metro level; flag
Dallas–Fort WorthHigher suburban availabilityCBREStrong; sales/sq ft above US avg2nd-highest deliveries nationallyBalanced
Houston5.6% vacancyC&W, Q1 2026BalancedHighest deliveries nationallyBalanced
ChicagoHigher availabilityCBRESlower / flatLowest pipeline among majorsBalanced
Los Angeles6.1–6.6% availabilityCBRE Q1 2025 / C&W Q1 2026Elevated corridorsLimitedSofterThin / divergent; flag
San Francisco / Bay AreaImproving; urban core softCBRE / C&W, Q1 2026Low urban rentsLimitedSofterDivergent; flag
DenverSofter demandCBRESlowerModerateSofter

Metro figures compiled from Cushman & Wakefield (Q3 2025–Q1 2026 MarketBeat), CBRE US Retail Figures, Matthews, TenantBase, and the MMCG database; see sources 1–4, 15, 20, and 24. Availability and vacancy are different bases, a 100–200 bps gap, and are not netted. Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco are flagged as thin or divergent at the metro-retail level, consistent with a high-street-versus-suburban split.

Availability and vacancy are different rulers

No figure on this page is more misused than the vacancy rate. CBRE and Colliers generally report availability, space marketed for lease whether or not it is physically empty, while Cushman & Wakefield and CoStar report vacancy, the space actually dark. CBRE's overall availability of 4.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2025 and C&W's shopping-center vacancy of 5.9 percent in the first quarter of 2026 describe different universes on different bases; the gap is definitional, not a disagreement about reality.14 The provider universes diverge further, since CBRE's “neighborhood, community and strip” excludes freestanding retail, CoStar's “NCC” includes it, and Green Street's “strip” folds in power centers, so segment figures from different providers cannot be netted.23 Any study that cites a single retail vacancy number without stating its universe is not defensible.

New supply has effectively stopped, and existing centers have pricing power

For over a decade almost nothing has been built, and little will be. CoStar reported retail construction activity down roughly twenty-seven percent in 2024 with a further forty-five percent decline forecast for 2025, and JLL found fourth-quarter 2025 groundbreakings forty-four percent below the prior year.56 Development is heavily concentrated in the Sun Belt, with Texas alone accounting for nearly a quarter of new retail construction in 2025.1 Per CBRE's James Breeze, the United States is “under-retailed by 200 million square feet, or roughly five percent of the existing stock,” with the need for space greatest in Austin, Orlando, and Nashville.3 The consequence is that well-located existing centers enjoy pricing power and fast backfill, and quality product trades at a discount to a replacement cost that new rents cannot justify.29

Cap rates split by format and credit, and capital has re-engaged

Retail yields are bifurcated. Grocery-anchored centers averaged roughly 6.7 percent nationally at year-end 2025, with a 160-plus-basis-point spread from Publix- and Trader Joe's-anchored product near 5.5 to 5.8 percent out to discount-tier anchored above 7.1 percent.7 Unanchored strip sat near 7.0 percent, single-tenant net-lease retail at 6.55 to 6.7 percent, unchanged for a second consecutive quarter despite a 4.48 percent ten-year Treasury, and malls carry the widest yields and the highest vacancy, near 8.9 percent.15161720 Grocery-anchored resilience rests on lease-form asymmetry, since anchors lock in 20-to-30-year terms below market while inline space, roughly 70 percent of GLA, re-prices every five to seven years; Phillips Edison, the largest pure-play grocery-anchored REIT, runs 97.1 percent leased occupancy with 82 percent of rent from number-one or number-two grocers.14 Investment has re-engaged: JLL reported first-quarter 2026 transaction volume of $15.3 billion, the strongest first quarter since 2023, and grocery-anchored volume surged forty-two percent to nearly $11 billion in 2025, with institutional buyer share at its highest in over a decade, as core buyers underwrite quality grocery product to 5.5 to 6.25 percent and REIT bid volume for grocery-anchored product rose 117 percent over two years.6719

Common Review Failures

How retail feasibility and tenancy forecasts fail review.

Tenancy, co-tenancy, and lease-up are the variables a credit committee scrutinizes most, and the places retail studies most often break. Each failure below is tied to a real mechanism or number.

  1. Tenant credit and co-tenancy risk

    Retail NOI is only as strong as the credit behind the leases, and co-tenancy clauses compound the risk. Many inline leases permit rent reduction or termination if an anchor closes or occupancy falls below a threshold, often 70 to 80 percent. A single anchor departure can trigger cascading co-tenancy relief that cuts center NOI by 40 to 60 percent in months. A study that capitalizes in-place rent without mapping co-tenancy triggers overstates stabilized NOI.20

  2. The dark-anchor, going-dark problem

    An anchor lease signed fifteen or twenty years ago at $8 to $12 per square foot can look rock-solid, but if the tenant goes dark, ceasing to operate while still paying or exercising a termination or bankruptcy right, the result is a vacant 40,000-plus-square-foot box that is hard to backfill and kills the traffic that supports inline sales. The rent continues; the traffic externality evaporates. Studies that capitalize anchor rent without stress-testing going-dark scenarios overstate value.

  3. Rollover cliff and WALT

    Concentrated lease expirations in any 12-to-24-month window create a rollover cliff: simultaneous vacancy, releasing cost, and downtime. Weighted-average lease term is central, and a center with a four-year WALT justifies a 50-to-100-basis-point wider cap rate than a comparable ten-year-WALT center. Forecasts that assume smooth renewals through a rollover cliff fail lender review.18

  4. Downtime and TI/LC underestimation

    Re-tenanting requires tenant-improvement allowances, leasing commissions, and months of downtime. National fit-out costs average roughly $149 per square foot, and JLL reported average time-to-lease of 7.6 months in the fourth quarter of 2025.246 Studies that assume zero downtime or below-market TI/LC reserves understate capital needs and overstate net cash flow.

  5. Grocery-anchor productivity and the health ratio

    The single most important grocery-tenant metric is occupancy cost, all-in rent including CAM divided by tenant gross sales. A healthy grocery anchor runs roughly 2 to 4 percent of sales, reflecting grocers' thin net margins near 1.7 percent, with sales productivity typically $400 to $700 per square foot.25 A study that fails to obtain or benchmark anchor sales productivity cannot assess renewal probability or dark-store risk. The classic ULI and ICSC benchmark publications are out of print; current named sources are FMI, Green Street, and REIT disclosures.

  6. E-commerce and category obsolescence

    Not all tenants face the same internet risk. CBRE identified 19 of 28 retail employment subsectors as highly susceptible to e-commerce, with bookstores the most vulnerable.3 A feasibility study must distinguish internet-resistant tenants, grocery, food service, fitness, medical, personal services, and discount, from internet-vulnerable ones such as apparel, electronics, and books. A mix weighted toward vulnerable categories carries higher renewal and default risk.

  7. Sizing to LTV alone

    Loan sizing is bound by the lowest of the loan-to-value, debt-service-coverage, and debt-yield tests, and for retail the binding constraint is frequently coverage or debt yield given rollover risk. Recent CMBS conduit pools cleared at conservative weighted averages near 1.8x DSCR and 12-plus-percent debt yield. A feasibility study that sizes to LTV alone overstates supportable debt.28

Capital-Source Routing

Which channel funds the project, and what it requires.

Retail routes through distinct capital sources, and each requires a different deliverable and coverage standard. The study is built to the union of requirements across the channels actually in play, and the first question is always whether the retail is passive investment or owner-occupied.

The retail lender matrix
Deliverable and coverage convention by capital source. Coverage figures are market conventions, not universal minimums.28
Capital sourceDeliverableCoverage convention
Conventional bank / CMBS / life-companyIncome-approach appraisal with full rent-roll / Argus modelDSCR 1.20x–1.30x+, LTV 65–75%, debt yield 8–9% (CMBS)
SBA 7(a) / 504 (owner-occupied)Feasibility for the occupying business51% existing / 60% new owner-occupancy
USDA B&I (rural)Owner-operated business feasibility80% / 70% / 60% guarantee by size; ~$25M max
Bridge / debt-fundLease-up, value-add, or repositioning planFloating, short term, future-funding for TI/LC
Fannie Mae / Freddie MacIncidental mixed-use component onlyNot a retail lender

Sources: CBRE underwriting data and CMBS conduit disclosures (Benchmark 2025-V17; BANK5 2025-5YR13); SBA SOP 50 10 8; USDA B&I / OneRD term sheets. See sources 26–28.

One eligibility trap is worth stating plainly, because sponsors hit it constantly: passive multi-tenant retail is generally not SBA-eligible. Under SOP 50 10 8, effective June 1, 2025, an applicant must occupy at least 51 percent of an existing building or 60 percent of new construction, and the SOP expressly clarifies that “shopping centers, office suites, salon suites, ghost kitchens, and similar business models that lease space are not eligible” unless the revenue comes from the applicant's own operating business or the structure qualifies as an Eligible Passive Company leasing to an eligible Operating Company.26 A shopping center leased to third parties therefore routes to conventional bank, CMBS, life-company, or bridge capital instead. The agencies are no help here either: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are multifamily lenders, and retail appears only as a capped, incidental component of small mixed-use apartment deals.

  • Passive multi-tenant acquisition or refinanceConventional bank, CMBS, or life-company on an income-approach appraisal and rent-roll model.
  • Value-add, lease-up, or ground-up developmentFeasibility study with sensitivity analysis; construction or bridge debt to a permanent takeout.
  • Owner-occupied retail (one business occupies 51% / 60%)SBA 7(a) or 504, subject to the owner-occupancy test.
  • Rural owner-operated retail (population under 50,000)USDA Business & Industry under the OneRD Guarantee Loan Initiative.27
  • Class B/C mall or dark-anchor repositioningBridge or debt-fund capital with future-funding for TI/LC and redevelopment.
Study Types

Market study, feasibility study, appraisal: three questions.

These three documents answer different questions and are not substitutes. Lenders and sponsors conflate them constantly; underwriters and credit committees do not.

What each document answers, and the standard that governs it.
DocumentQuestion answeredGoverning standard
AppraisalWhat is it worth? An income-approach opinion of value built on the rent roll, NOI, and cap rate.USPAP
Market studyIs there demand? Trade-area demographics, the competitive set, absorption, and achievable rent.Trade-area demand analysis
Feasibility studyDoes this deal pencil for this lender? The market study plus stabilized NOI, DSCR and debt-yield tests, and sensitivity for anchor departure, co-tenancy, and delayed lease-up.Lender underwriting + income approach

The distinction that governs a retail file is that multi-tenant retail is valued as income-producing real estate, not as a going concern. Gas stations, car washes, and senior-care facilities are valued as operating businesses, real estate plus business enterprise value plus fixtures; multi-tenant retail is valued through the income approach on leases, NOI, and cap rate. The rent roll is the center of the work: contract rent versus market rent, weighted-average lease term, tenant credit, escalations, expense recoveries, and lease-up or absorption for value-add and development deals. Direct capitalization values stabilized NOI; discounted cash flow is appropriate wherever there is lease-up, rollover, contractual rent steps, or a major capital plan, and Argus is the standard modeling tool, inserting a market leasing profile, market rent, downtime, TI and LC, at each lease expiration.

One scope boundary is worth stating. A lender will typically require a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment, but the feasibility or market-study author does not perform the Phase I or II ESA; that is a separate environmental professional's engagement. The market and feasibility work normalizes above- and below-market leases to sustainable cash flow, tests the rollover schedule, and sizes releasing cost; it does not opine on environmental condition.

Retail sub-segments, each with a distinct study scope

Retail Questions

Retail feasibility and market-study questions.

What is the difference between a retail market study and a feasibility study?

A market study assesses supply and demand in a trade area, meaning demographics, the competitive set, absorption, and achievable rent, and answers whether there is demand. A feasibility study goes further, testing whether a specific center can reach stabilized occupancy and cash flow sufficient to meet the lender's debt-service-coverage and debt-yield thresholds under conservative assumptions, including sensitivity analysis for anchor departure, co-tenancy triggers, rent compression, and delayed lease-up. It answers whether the deal pencils for this lender. For stabilized acquisitions a lender may accept an income-approach appraisal with full rent-roll modeling; for value-add, lease-up, or development it will require the feasibility study.

How is a multi-tenant retail center valued, as a business or as real estate?

As real estate. Unlike gas stations, car washes, or senior-care facilities, which are valued as going-concern businesses combining real estate, business enterprise value, and fixtures, a multi-tenant retail center is valued through the income approach on its leases, net operating income, and cap rate. The rent roll drives value: contract rent versus market rent, weighted-average lease term, tenant credit and anchor co-tenancy, escalations, and expense recoveries. Direct capitalization is used for stabilized income and discounted cash flow, typically modeled in Argus, wherever there is lease-up, rollover, or a major capital plan.

Can a shopping center be financed with an SBA loan?

Generally no. SBA finances an operating business that occupies its own building, not passive multi-tenant investment retail. Under SOP 50 10 8, effective June 1, 2025, the applicant must occupy at least 51 percent of an existing building or 60 percent of new construction, and the SOP expressly states that shopping centers and similar space-leasing models are not eligible unless the revenue is earned from the applicant's own eligible business or the structure qualifies as an Eligible Passive Company leasing to an eligible Operating Company. A shopping center leased to third parties routes to conventional bank, CMBS, life-company, or bridge capital instead; rural owner-operated retail may qualify for USDA Business & Industry financing.

What is co-tenancy risk, and why does it matter to lenders?

Co-tenancy clauses let inline tenants reduce rent or terminate their leases if an anchor closes or center occupancy falls below a stated threshold, often 70 to 80 percent. Because a single anchor departure can trigger cascading relief that cuts center NOI by 40 to 60 percent within months, co-tenancy is one of the sharpest risks in retail underwriting. A feasibility study must map which leases carry co-tenancy provisions, model the downside NOI on an anchor departure, and size the loan to that stressed cash flow rather than to in-place rent.

Is e-commerce killing physical retail?

No, the data show maturation rather than collapse. The U.S. Census Bureau reported e-commerce at 16.6 percent of total retail sales in the fourth quarter of 2025, growing steadily rather than at the pandemic-era pace. Physical stores increasingly serve as omnichannel fulfillment, pickup, and return nodes, which reinforces demand for well-located open-air space. The distinction that matters for underwriting is by category: internet-resistant tenants such as grocery, food service, fitness, medical, and discount are far more durable than internet-vulnerable categories such as apparel, electronics, and books.

Which retail markets are tightest right now?

As of early 2026 the tightest markets are concentrated in the South and Sun Belt. Of the markets with vacancy below 4.0 percent in recent quarters, only Boston sat outside the South. Miami-Dade, Raleigh-Durham, Nashville, Salt Lake City, Charleston, Charlotte, and Tampa all screen as landlord's markets with limited new supply, while Cushman & Wakefield put national shopping-center vacancy at 5.9 percent, well below its 7.4 percent historical average. Softer, more tenant-friendly markets include Denver, Chicago, and the urban cores of Los Angeles and San Francisco.

What cap rate does grocery-anchored retail trade at?

Grocery-anchored centers averaged roughly 6.7 percent nationally at year-end 2025, down about 40 basis points from the 2023 cyclical peak, with a spread of more than 160 basis points across anchor credit, from about 5.5 to 5.8 percent for Publix- and Trader Joe's-anchored product to above 7.1 percent for discount-tier anchored centers. Unanchored strip traded near 7.0 percent and single-tenant net-lease retail at 6.55 percent, while power centers repriced wider on big-box tenant risk and malls carried the widest yields. Grocery-anchored transaction volume surged 42 percent to nearly 11 billion dollars in 2025, with institutional buyer share at its highest in over a decade.

By Market

Retail feasibility studies by state.

Retail demand, tenant mix, and the competitive set are local. Explore the state markets where availability, the anchor roster, and trade-area spending determine whether a center pencils.

Underwriting a retail center? Start with the rent roll.

A methodology briefing walks through the analytical framework, the deliverable your capital source requires, and the current supply, tenancy, and cap-rate data for your format and trade area.

Request a methodology briefing
Sources

Data sources and dates.

Every figure on this page traces to a named authority. Retail readings are point-in-time and vendor-dependent; availability and vacancy differ by basis, and rent figures are asking unless noted, as flagged throughout.

  1. CBRE, Q4 2025 US Retail Figures: overall availability 4.8%, net absorption 11.3 million sq ft, deliveries (4.5 million sq ft Q1 2025; ~5 million Q4 2025), and Texas share of new construction (~25%).
  2. CBRE, Q2 2025 US Retail Figures and CBRE via Retail Dive (September 2025): neighborhood/community/strip record-low 6.7% availability, power-center negative net absorption (−727,000 sq ft), and lifestyle/mall availability (6.2%).
  3. James Breeze, CBRE, “Five Forces Shaping the Future of Retail”: the US under-retailed by ~200 million sq ft (~5% of stock); Austin, Orlando, and Nashville at 2–3% availability; 19 of 28 retail employment subsectors highly susceptible to e-commerce.
  4. Cushman & Wakefield, Q1 2026 US Shopping Center MarketBeat: 5.9% national vacancy, $25.48/sq ft asking rent (+2.3% YoY), −4.6 million sq ft net absorption, active pipeline under 0.3% of inventory, and metro vacancy reads.
  5. CoStar and Green Street (as of Q1 2025, with NCREIF): retail completions averaging ~0.5% of inventory annually 2009–2024, the lowest of the major property types; construction activity down ~27% in 2024 with a further ~45% decline forecast for 2025.
  6. JLL, Q1 2026 US Retail Outlook, with commentary from James Cook (Commercial Observer, February 2026; GlobeSt, June 2026): 7.8 million sq ft delivered, −4.4 million sq ft net absorption, $15.3 billion transaction volume, groundbreakings 44% below Q4 2024, and 7.6-month average time-to-lease.
  7. JLL Grocery Tracker 2026: grocery-anchored ~6.7% national cap rate, anchor-tier spread (~5.5–5.8% to 7.1%+), volume +42% to nearly $11 billion in 2025, and institutional buyer share ~27%.
  8. Coresight Research year-end tracker (January 27, 2026) and midyear update (June 2025): 8,270 US store closures against 5,270 openings in 2025 (revised 2024: 8,825); 120+ million sq ft closed by mid-2025; ~7,900 closures / ~5,500 openings projected for 2026.
  9. S&P Global Market Intelligence (2025): US corporate bankruptcy filings at a 15-year high.
  10. Chain Store Age, CNBC, and CoStar (2025–2026): retailer store-opening plans (Dollar General, Dollar Tree, Aldi, Burlington, TJX, Ross, Ollie's, and warehouse clubs).
  11. U.S. Census Bureau (released March 10, 2026): Q4 2025 e-commerce at 16.6% of total retail sales (seasonally adjusted), full-year 2025 at 16.4%, and Q1 2026 at 16.9%.
  12. Kimco Realty 8-K (February 12, 2026): 96.4% pro-rata leased occupancy (all-time record), 92.7% small-shop occupancy, 13.8% blended and 29.0% new-lease pro-rata cash spread, and FY2025 FFO of $1.76/share (+6.7%).
  13. Regency Centers (February 2026) and Brixmor (2025): same-property NOI growth of 4.7% in Q4 2025; record small-shop occupancy.
  14. Phillips Edison & Company (PECO), 2025 disclosures: 97.1% leased occupancy; 82% of annualized base rent from #1 or #2 grocers by market share.
  15. Matthews Real Estate Investment Services (H2 2025) and Marcus & Millichap (May 2026): unanchored strip ~7.0% (Northeast 7.3%), grocery-anchored 5.7%, and STNL transaction count +23% / dollar volume +20% in 2025.
  16. The Boulder Group, Q1 2026 Net Lease Research Report (released April 2, 2026): STNL retail cap rate 6.55% (unchanged for a second consecutive quarter), overall net-lease 6.80%, Randy Blankstein commentary on the 4.48% 10-year Treasury, credit-tier ranges (McDonald's ground lease 4.40% to Walgreens 8.10%), and listed supply down 9.8% QoQ.
  17. Colliers (H2 2025): single-tenant net-lease cap rate 6.7% with ~$294/sq ft pricing.
  18. Wiss (2025): power-center repricing to 7.5–9% on big-box tenant risk; WALT-driven cap-rate spread (a four-year WALT justifying 50–100 bps versus a ten-year WALT).
  19. Schuckman Realty (2026): core buyers underwriting quality grocery-anchored product to 5.5–6.25%; REIT bid volume for grocery-anchored product up 117% over two years.
  20. MMCG database (2025): segment vacancy compilation (mall ~8.9%, power ~4.7%, general/freestanding retail ~2.7%) and co-tenancy NOI-impairment ranges (40–60%). Proprietary single-provider; treated as indicative.
  21. Simon Property Group FY2025 earnings release (February 2, 2026): 96.4% occupancy, base minimum rent of $60.97/sq ft (+4.7%), reported retailer sales of $799/sq ft (Taubman-blended), and ~12.7% occupancy cost (per the earnings call).
  22. Macerich 8-K (February 18, 2026): 94.0% leased portfolio occupancy, $881/sq ft inline sales, Crabtree Mall acquisition (~$290 million at ~11% initial NOI yield), and the Class B redevelopment program.
  23. Green Street (2025–2026): mall class counts (~250–300 B malls, ~28% of US malls), traffic versus 2019, and segment definitions (“strip” including power centers).
  24. TenantBase (2026): national fit-out cost averaging ~$149/sq ft; metro lease-time reads (Charlotte ~4.7 months, Tampa).
  25. FMI (2024) and CRE-education glossaries (A.CRE, Realized, Bullpen / John Grellner): grocery occupancy-cost band (~2–4% of sales), sales productivity ($400–$700/sq ft; $18.55 weekly sales per sq ft of selling area), and grocer net margins near 1.7%. Indicative ranges, not audited standards, as the classic ULI and ICSC benchmarks are out of print.
  26. U.S. Small Business Administration, SOP 50 10 8 (effective June 1, 2025): 51% (existing) and 60% (new-construction) owner-occupancy tests; passive-retail ineligibility; the Eligible Passive Company / Operating Company structure under 13 CFR §120.111; citizenship-requirement change effective March 1, 2026.
  27. USDA Rural Development, Business & Industry (B&I) Guaranteed Loan Program under the OneRD Guarantee Loan Initiative: rural retail eligibility, guarantee percentages (80% / 70% / 60% by loan size), ~$25 million maximum, and typical 10% equity with job creation/retention.
  28. CMBS conduit disclosures (Benchmark 2025-V17: 58.0% WA cut-off LTV, 1.82x WA DSCR, 12.4% WA debt yield; BANK5 2025-5YR13: 1.81x DSCR, 12.9% debt yield) and CBRE average LTV (~63.3%).
  29. Marcus & Millichap (2025–2026): $50.8 billion total transaction volume in 2025 (retail 42% of the Q4 2025 mix) and the replacement-cost-gap thesis for institutional retail buyers.