Feasibility Study Company Independent Feasibility Analysis

Hotel & Hospitality · Asset Class

Hotel & Hospitality Feasibility & Market Studies

Independent, lender-grade analysis for hotels and lodging across SBA 7(a) and 504, USDA Business and Industry, conventional bank, CMBS, life-company, and bridge capital. This page is our standing read on where new supply is muted and where the pipeline threatens a ramp, how RevPAR, penetration, and ramp-up forecasts fail review, and the difference between the market study, the feasibility study, and the going-concern appraisal a lender requires.

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$100.02
2025 U.S. RevPAR, the first decline since 20201
1.3%
2025 supply growth, well below the long-run 2%3
71.3%
Q4 2025 extended-stay occupancy, ~14 ppt premium7
$24B
2025 hotel transaction volume, up 17.5%4
The Hotel Thesis

A hotel is a business that occupies real estate.

A hotel is not real estate that happens to house a business; it is a business that happens to occupy real estate. Revenue is re-priced nightly, is highly perishable, an unsold room-night is lost forever, and is delivered through a labor-intensive operating platform. That is why hotels sit in the same going-concern family as gas stations, car washes, senior care, and truck stops, and why lenders and appraisers value them on business-enterprise value, real estate plus FF&E plus brand, flag, and goodwill, rather than on a passive rent roll. We prepare the market study, the feasibility study, and the going-concern appraisal input a lodging file needs, aligned to the standard that will judge it.

The market itself is at an inflection. The 2020 collapse recovered on an ADR-led arc through 2024, when U.S. RevPAR hit a nominal record $99.94 on 63 percent occupancy and a $158.67 ADR, then normalized: full-year 2025 posted the first occupancy and RevPAR declines since 2020, occupancy 62.3 percent, ADR $160.54, RevPAR $100.02.1 Real, inflation-adjusted ADR still sits below 2019, and occupancy remains under the 66.1 percent of 2019. Yet the sector has a structural support: new supply grew only about 1.3 percent in 2025, well below the long-run 2 percent, because high construction costs and expensive debt suppress ground-up starts.3 A single national RevPAR number is analytically useless: performance is sharply bifurcated by chain scale, by service model, and by metro, and a supply-constrained gateway and a high-pipeline Sun Belt market can face opposite conditions.

What follows is organized as a working desk: a national and metro RevPAR and supply monitor, the ramp-up and penetration failure forensics that sink hotel studies, the capital-source routing that decides which deliverable a project needs, and the study-type distinctions competitors state loosely. Every figure is dated and attributed in the sources below.

The RevPAR & Supply Monitor

Where the hotel market stands, market by market.

A supply-pressure read for the major US lodging markets, compiled from named primary sources. Sorted from most supply-constrained to highest supply pressure. Occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR are full-year 2025 CoStar figures unless noted; the top 25 markets anchor the matrix.

The national picture frames every metro. U.S. RevPAR hit a nominal record $99.94 in 2024, then full-year 2025 posted the first occupancy and RevPAR declines since 2020, occupancy 62.3 percent, ADR $160.54, RevPAR $100.02, with New York City leading all top-25 markets at 84.1 percent occupancy and a $280.71 RevPAR.1 The 2026 outlook is roughly flat, with CoStar and Tourism Economics projecting RevPAR up about 0.5 percent, ADR up 0.9 percent, and occupancy near 62 percent, plus a FIFA World Cup lift of roughly 40 basis points.12 The structural support is supply: total U.S. pipeline stood at 6,146 projects and 720,089 rooms at the fourth quarter of 2025, with only 1,088 projects and 134,380 rooms under construction, and 2025 delivered just 640 new hotels and 74,079 rooms, census supply growth of about 1.3 percent.3 Beneath the national line the market is K-shaped by chain scale and split by metro, so a single RevPAR figure blends thriving and distressed segments into noise. Demand itself is mending unevenly: group business in the top 25 markets recovered 99.1 percent of 2019 by the third quarter of 2023, while leisure and business transient sit modestly below 2019, and 2026 to 2028 mega-events, the FIFA World Cup and the Los Angeles Olympics, are a tailwind.15

Supply pressure: Supply-constrained Balanced High supply. Figures are market-aggregate, all chain scales; occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR are full-year 2025 CoStar unless a cell notes otherwise.
Market Occupancy (2025) ADR / RevPAR (2025) Supply pipeline Supply pressure
New York City84.1%$333.71 / $280.71Regulatory moatLocal Law 18 cut Airbnb ~70%; hotel text amendmentSupply-constrained
San Francisco~68% of 2019convention basis$225.82 / $155.84RevPAR +11.8% YoYNear-empty pipelineSupply-constrained
BostonHigh~$232 (2024) / Strong“Empty” per HVSSupply-constrained
Miami~70%+High / StrongElevated24 projects / 4,843 rooms UC, Q4 2025Balanced
Los AngelesModerateHigh / SolidModerate2028 Olympics tailwindBalanced
OrlandoHighElevated / SolidModeratetheme-park + OCCC conventionBalanced
ChicagoModerateModerate / ImprovingLow–moderateMcCormick Place calendar-drivenBalanced
SeattleModerateModerate / SolidModeratetech-demand-sensitiveBalanced
Washington DCModerateModerate / Soft in 2025Low–moderateRevPAR Apr–Sept 2025 −6.7%Balanced
Las Vegas~62–66%$199.79 / $149.13RevPAR −10.9%; event-drivenModerateBalanced
PhoenixSeasonalModerate / SolidHIGH123 projects; 35 UC, most in U.S.High supply
AtlantaModerateModerate / MixedHIGH165 projects / 19,027 rooms, Q2 2025High supply
NashvilleModerate–highElevated / SolidHIGH128 projects / 17,025 rooms, Q2 2025High supply
DallasModerateModerate / SolidHIGHESTrecord ~24,497 rooms pipeline, Q2 2025High supply
Houston58.9%−8.6%, steepest top-25 dropModerate / SoftElevatedenergy-driven; 40-day labor strikeHigh supply

Market figures compiled from CoStar (formerly STR) full-year 2025 releases, Lodging Econometrics Q2–Q4 2025 pipeline reports, HVS, JLL, and the MMCG database; see sources 1, 3–4, 6, and 14. The top 25 markets hold about 31.5 percent of U.S. rooms but produce roughly 43 percent of room revenue, so they anchor the matrix; thinner markets are flagged in-cell. Feasibility is driven by demand character and the pipeline, not the RevPAR level alone.

RevPAR, ADR, and occupancy measure different things

No figure on this page is more misused than RevPAR taken out of context. RevPAR is ADR multiplied by occupancy, so the same RevPAR can reflect a full house at a low rate or a half-empty house at a premium rate, two very different risk profiles. The post-2020 recovery was ADR-led: rate reached a nominal record before occupancy recovered, and occupancy still sits below 2019 at 62.3 percent versus 66.1 percent, while real, inflation-adjusted ADR remains below 2019.1 ADR is now growing below the rate of inflation, which puts pressure on margins even when the headline RevPAR looks flat.12 Provider bases differ as well: CoStar is the dominant performance source and defines chain scales by brand systemwide ADR, AHLA sizes the industry, and CBRE reports operating-statement economics, so same-store, sample, and census figures should never be blended without labeling.2 Any study that cites a single RevPAR or occupancy number without stating its basis is not defensible.

A muted supply pipeline is the sector's structural support

For the existing owner, weak new construction is good news. Supply grew only 0.2 percent in 2023 and 0.5 percent in 2024, then about 1.3 percent in 2025, all well below the long-run 2 percent, because high construction costs and expensive, scarce construction debt make few ground-up projects pencil.3 Median development cost runs about $167,000 per key for limited-service to over $1,057,000 per key for luxury, with an all-type median near $219,000 per key, so at a luxury cost near $1 million per key and 65 percent occupancy a project needs roughly a $1,000 ADR to pencil against a YTD 2025 luxury ADR of about $394.6 Even where a market shows a large pipeline, that supply is concentrated: the South and Southwest lead, with Dallas, Atlanta, Nashville, Austin, and Phoenix topping the rankings, while extended-stay dominates the national pipeline at roughly 40 percent of projects and its own supply growth accelerated to 5.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2025.37 Extended-stay outperforms on margin in part because its departmental labor averages about $9.31 per occupied room against $20.34 for a traditional hotel, and economy and midscale cap rates ran a wide 8.6 to 13.1 percent for the twelve months ending October 2025.17

Margins compress, cap rates hold, and capital has re-engaged selectively

Labor is the dominant and fastest-growing expense. Full-service GOP margin fell from 36.9 percent in 2019 to 33.5 percent in 2024, expenses above GOP rose 4.1 percent against 2.3 percent revenue growth, and operators paid 22.1 percent more than 2019 for 7.4 percent fewer hours worked, with insurance up 17.4 percent and property taxes up 4.3 percent.5 Staffing remains a binding constraint, with 65 percent of hotels reporting shortages and 9 percent severely understaffed in an AHLA and Hireology survey, and industry employment nearly 10 percent below pre-pandemic levels.16 The segmentation is K-shaped: 2025 luxury RevPAR grew 3 percent entirely on ADR while economy RevPAR fell 4.4 percent and midscale fell 2.8 percent, and extended-stay outperformed on margin and occupancy.47 Capital is thawing but selective: hotel cap rates stabilized around 7.3 to 8.1 percent by mid-2025, and by late 2025 hospitality debt near 7.11 percent against cap rates near 8.17 percent restored roughly 106 basis points of positive leverage.513 Transaction volume climbed 17.5 percent to $24 billion in 2025, led by New York, Phoenix, and Washington DC, even as CMBS lodging delinquency rose to 6.61 percent in December 2025, the largest monthly jump of the major sectors.48

Common Review Failures

How hotel feasibility and ramp-up forecasts fail review.

Penetration, ramp-up, and the going-concern cost structure are the variables a credit committee scrutinizes most, and the places hotel studies most often break. Each failure below is tied to a real mechanism or number.

  1. Assuming stabilized performance from day one

    New hotels ramp over roughly two to four years. STR data show new-construction hotels reach a 100 percent RevPAR index around month 17, with the occupancy index starting near 58 percent in month one, and Cornell research finds an average occupancy build-up of about three years. A pro forma that skips the ramp overstates early NOI and DSCR.9

  2. Above-fair-share penetration without justification

    The STR competitive-set RevPAR index, a hotel's RevPAR divided by the competitive set's RevPAR, is the core penetration test. Assuming a new entrant will immediately exceed 100 percent of fair share without a demand-generator or product-quality rationale, or defining the competitive set to cherry-pick weak comparables, is a classic and common failure.14

  3. Overstating ADR growth and mis-balancing rate versus occupancy

    The ADR-led recovery has slowed, and ADR is now growing below inflation. Aggressive ADR ramp assumptions that ignore the rate-versus-occupancy trade-off, buying occupancy with rate or the reverse, fail scrutiny because they inflate RevPAR the market will not deliver.112

  4. New-competition risk during the ramp

    A competing flag opening nearby during lease-up can permanently reset the penetration assumption. This risk is acute in high-pipeline markets, Dallas with the country's largest pipeline near a record 24,497 rooms, plus Nashville, Atlanta, Austin, and Phoenix, where a competitor can open next door mid-ramp.3

  5. FF&E reserve and PIP or capex underestimation

    Hotel management agreements typically require an FF&E reserve of 3 to 5 percent of total revenue, and brand-mandated Property Improvement Plans on acquisition or renewal run roughly $8,000 to $50,000 per room by tier and condition, up more than 30 percent above pre-COVID levels. Omitting these overstates distributable cash flow.6

  6. GOP, flow-through, and expense-structure errors

    Ignoring the 10 to 14 percent franchise and brand-fee load on room revenue, management fees, undistributed-cost rigidity, and realistic flow-through overstates margin, and insurance, up 17.4 percent in 2024, and property taxes are frequently underbudgeted. Full-service GOP margin has compressed to about 33.5 percent.5

  7. Break-even, seasonality, and DSCR-constrained sizing

    Because hotels are cash-flow-volatile, lenders demand higher DSCR and debt yield than for passive real estate, and SBA hotel deals commonly clear about 1.15x to 1.25x minimum at stabilization. Sun Belt and resort markets swing 30 to 50 percent seasonally, so a flat monthly pro forma understates working capital, and a deal that only clears at stabilized run-rate breaks in ramp year one.10

Capital-Source Routing

Which channel funds the project, and what it requires.

Hotels route through distinct capital sources, and each requires a different deliverable and coverage standard. The study is built to the union of requirements across the channels actually in play, and the first question is always whether the sponsor will operate the hotel or hold it passively.

The hotel lender matrix
Deliverable and coverage convention by capital source. Coverage figures are market conventions, not universal minimums.10
Capital sourceDeliverableCoverage convention
SBA 7(a) / 504 (owner-operated)Third-party STR-based feasibility and going-concern appraisal15% equity (20% if startup); ~1.15x–1.25x DSCR; flag in SBA Franchise Directory
USDA B&I (rural)Owner-operated lodging feasibility80% / 70% / 60% guarantee by size; ~$25M max; 10% / 20% equity
Conventional bank / life-companyGoing-concern appraisal with penetration and stabilized-NOI analysis65–75% LTV, 25–35% equity, often recourse
CMBS conduitGoing-concern underwriting; STR-based projectionsHigher DSCR / debt yield; 2026 maturity-wall refinancing
Bridge / debt-fundAcquire, reposition, re-flag, or PIP planFloating, short term, future-funding for PIP / capex

Sources: SBA SOP 50 10 8 and CRS IN12549; USDA Rural Development B&I / OneRD term sheets; CBRE, HVS, and PeerSense underwriting data. See sources 10, 11, 13, and 18.

One distinction is worth stating plainly, because it separates hotels from passive property types: an owner-operated hotel is SBA-eligible. Where a shopping center or an apartment building fails the owner-occupancy test, the owner of a hotel satisfies it by operating the hotel business itself, which makes hotels, especially limited-service, select-service, and flagged properties, one of the largest SBA use categories, with 7(a) setting a record $37.3 billion in fiscal 2025.10 The trap here is not eligibility but scope. SBA classifies hotels as special-purpose properties, which triggers a mandatory third-party feasibility study for virtually all hotel 7(a) and 504 applications and higher equity, 15 percent for special-purpose and 20 percent if also a startup, under SOP 50 10 8, effective June 1, 2025. That SOP reinstated the SBA Franchise Directory, so the flag must be listed or the lender must complete a detailed franchise and management-agreement review, and hotel loans typically carry a higher minimum DSCR given cash-flow volatility.10

  • Owner-operated flagged limited- or select-service acquisition or buildSBA 7(a) or 504 with a special-purpose feasibility study and the flag confirmed in the SBA Franchise Directory.
  • Rural hotel, motel, or resort (population under 50,000)USDA Business & Industry under the OneRD Guarantee Loan Initiative, up to ~$25 million.11
  • Stabilized full-service or upper-upscale acquisition or refinanceConventional bank, life-company, or CMBS on a going-concern appraisal and penetration analysis.
  • Acquire, reposition, re-flag, and complete a PIPBridge or debt-fund capital with future-funding for the PIP, then refinance into SBA, CMBS, or bank debt.
  • Ground-up developmentConstruction debt with more equity and conservative underwriting, taking out to permanent SBA, CMBS, or bank financing.18
Study Types

Market study, feasibility study, appraisal: three questions.

These three documents answer different questions and are not substitutes. Lenders and sponsors conflate them constantly; underwriters and credit committees do not.

What each document answers, and the standard that governs it.
DocumentQuestion answeredGoverning standard
AppraisalWhat is it worth? A going-concern, business-enterprise value via the income approach on stabilized NOI net of a management fee and an FF&E reserve.USPAP
Market studyIs there demand? It sizes demand, supply, and the competitive set for the market.Competitive-set demand analysis
Feasibility studyWill it penetrate, ramp, and cover its debt? The market study plus an STR-based penetration analysis, a ramp to stabilization, and a DSCR test.Lender underwriting + income approach

The distinction that governs a lodging file is that a hotel is valued as a going concern, real estate plus FF&E plus business, flag, and goodwill, not as passive real estate. The income-capitalization approach is the gold standard: stabilized NOI, net of a management fee and an FF&E reserve, capitalized or run through a discounted cash flow, with the cost approach, replacement cost per key plus land, and the sales-comparison approach, price per key, providing support. Total going-concern value is then allocated among real property, personal property or FF&E, and intangible business or flag value, commonly near real estate 60 to 75 percent, FF&E 10 to 20 percent, and intangible 10 to 25 percent as a practitioner rule of thumb. Under the Rushmore approach, income attributable to the business and to tangible personal property is deducted to leave net income attributable to the real estate, which is capitalized to a real-estate value.

One scope boundary is worth stating. A lender will typically require a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment, but the feasibility or market-study author does not perform the Phase I or II ESA; that is a separate environmental professional's engagement. The market and feasibility work benchmarks the pro forma's stabilized occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR against STR market and competitive-set data, projects the penetration ramp, and sizes the FF&E reserve and any PIP; it does not opine on environmental condition.

Hotel sub-segments, each with a distinct study scope

Hotel Questions

Hotel feasibility and market-study questions.

What is the difference between a hotel market study and a feasibility study?

A market study sizes demand, supply, and the competitive set for a defined market. A hotel feasibility study goes further, using an STR-based penetration analysis to test whether a specific project can achieve fair-share penetration of its competitive set, ramp to stabilized occupancy and ADR over a realistic two-to-four-year build-up, and cover debt at a viable DSCR. It answers whether the deal pencils for this lender under conservative assumptions, including sensitivity for a competitor opening mid-ramp, ADR softness, and seasonality. For a stabilized acquisition a lender may accept a going-concern appraisal; for new construction, conversion, or repositioning it will require the market study and feasibility together.

Why is a hotel valued as a going concern rather than as real estate?

A hotel is a business that occupies real estate, not passive real estate that houses a business. Revenue is re-priced nightly and is perishable, an unsold room-night is lost forever, and it is delivered through a labor-intensive operating platform. Lenders and appraisers therefore value hotels on business-enterprise value, real estate plus FF&E plus brand, flag, and goodwill, using the income approach on stabilized net operating income net of a management fee and an FF&E reserve. Total going-concern value is then allocated among real property, personal property or FF&E, and intangible business or flag value, commonly near real estate 60 to 75 percent, FF&E 10 to 20 percent, and intangible 10 to 25 percent as a practitioner rule of thumb.

Can a hotel be financed with an SBA loan?

Yes. Unlike passive investment real estate, an owner-operated hotel is an eligible SBA going concern because the owner satisfies the owner-occupancy test by operating the hotel business itself. Hotels, especially limited-service, select-service, and flagged properties, are one of the largest SBA use categories. SBA classifies them as special-purpose properties, which triggers a mandatory third-party feasibility study for virtually all hotel 7(a) and 504 applications and higher equity, 15 percent for special-purpose and 20 percent if also a startup, under SOP 50 10 8, effective June 1, 2025. That SOP reinstated the SBA Franchise Directory, so the flag must be listed or the lender must complete a detailed franchise and management-agreement review. Hotel loans typically carry a higher minimum DSCR, often about 1.15x to 1.25x.

How long does a new hotel take to ramp to stabilized occupancy?

Roughly two to four years, not day one. STR data show new-construction hotels reach a 100 percent RevPAR index around month 17, with the occupancy index starting near 58 percent in month one. Cornell research finds an average occupancy build-up of about three years, with top-25 markets stabilizing faster than smaller markets. Brand-managed hotels ramp faster than independents. Select-service properties near strong demand generators stabilize sooner; larger full-service and remote hotels stabilize more slowly. A pro forma that assumes stabilized performance from opening overstates early NOI and DSCR and fails lender and SBA review.

What is the STR competitive-set RevPAR index and why does it matter?

The competitive-set RevPAR index is a hotel's RevPAR divided by the RevPAR of its defined competitive set, expressed as a percentage where 100 percent is fair share. It is the core penetration test in hotel feasibility and appraisal. Assuming a new entrant will immediately exceed 100 percent without a demand-generator or product-quality rationale is a classic failure, as is defining the competitive set to cherry-pick weak comparables and inflate the index. A defensible study justifies the competitive set, projects a penetration ramp, and stress-tests it for new competition opening during lease-up.

Which hotel markets carry the most supply risk right now?

As of 2026 the highest supply pressure is concentrated in the Sun Belt and Southwest. Dallas leads with the largest pipeline in the country, a record roughly 24,497 rooms, followed by Atlanta, Nashville, Austin, and Phoenix, where a competing flag can open next door during a two-to-four-year ramp and permanently reset the penetration assumption. By contrast, supply-constrained gateways such as New York City, San Francisco, and Boston have near-empty pipelines, and a moderate RevPAR can still support a new project there because fair-share penetration is achievable and new competition is unlikely. Nationally, new supply grew only about 1.3 percent in 2025, well below the long-run 2 percent, which supports existing-hotel performance.

What are franchise fees, PIP, and FF&E reserves in hotel underwriting?

A brand flag delivers a reservation system, loyalty base, and brand standards but costs roughly 10 to 14 percent of room revenue in combined royalty, reservation, marketing, and loyalty fees. On acquisition or franchise renewal the brand can mandate a Property Improvement Plan, or PIP, running roughly $8,000 to $50,000 per room by tier and condition. Hotel management agreements typically require an FF&E reserve of 3 to 5 percent of total revenue to fund periodic replacement of furniture, fixtures, and equipment. A pro forma that omits the franchise-fee load, the PIP where the flag requires one, or an adequate FF&E reserve overstates distributable cash flow and fails review.

By Market

Hotel feasibility studies by state.

Hotel demand, the competitive set, and the supply pipeline are local. Explore the state markets where occupancy, ADR, and the rooms under construction determine whether a project penetrates its competitive set and pencils.

Underwriting a hotel project? Start with the penetration analysis.

Feasibility Study Company prepares independent Hotel & Hospitality feasibility and market studies, built to the review standard your capital source applies. A methodology briefing walks through the analytical framework, the deliverable your capital source requires, and the current RevPAR, supply-pipeline, and cap-rate data for your chain scale, service model, and market.

Request a methodology briefing
Sources

Data sources and dates.

Every figure on this page traces to a named authority. Hotel readings are point-in-time and vendor-dependent; performance figures are labeled by basis, RevPAR versus ADR versus occupancy, same-store versus census, and nominal versus real, and 2026 figures are forecasts, as flagged throughout.

  1. CoStar (formerly STR), year-end 2024 and full-year 2025 U.S. hotel performance (Arlington, VA, January 20, 2026): 2024 occupancy 63%, ADR $158.67, RevPAR $99.94 (a nominal record); 2025 occupancy 62.3%, ADR $160.54, RevPAR $100.02, the first full-year occupancy and RevPAR declines since 2020; New York City leading the top 25 markets (occupancy 84.1%, ADR $333.71, RevPAR $280.71); 2019 baseline occupancy 66.1%, ADR $131.21, RevPAR $86.76; real ADR still below 2019.
  2. American Hotel & Lodging Association (AHLA), 2025 Economic Impact Report and 2025 State of the Industry: 64,000+ properties, ~5.7 million guestrooms, ~1.3 billion room nights annually, ~70% of rooms branded; hotels reaching 2.17 million workers in 2025 (about 200,000 below the 2019 level of 2.37 million) and a record $128.47 billion in wages and benefits; guest spending ~$777.25 billion in 2025.
  3. Lodging Econometrics, Q4 2025 U.S. Construction Pipeline Trend Report (January 2026): total pipeline 6,146 projects / 720,089 rooms; 1,088 projects / 134,380 rooms under construction; 640 hotels / 74,079 rooms opened in 2025 (census supply growth ~1.3%); forecasts of 1.4% for 2026 and 1.5%–1.6% for 2027; Dallas the largest market pipeline (record ~24,497 rooms, Q2 2025), with Atlanta, Nashville, Austin, and Phoenix following.
  4. JLL, 2025 U.S. Hotel Investment Trends Report (February 5, 2026): transaction volume $24 billion, +17.5% YoY, led by New York ($3.7B / 29 trades), Phoenix ($1.5B), and Washington DC ($1.2B), with Kevin Davis noting the cost of debt down almost 300 basis points; 2025 chain-scale RevPAR (luxury +3%, midscale −2.8%, economy −4.4%).
  5. CBRE Hotels Research, Trends survey (February/March 2025) and H2 2025 Cap Rate Survey: full-service GOP margin 36.9% (2019) to 33.5% (2024); expenses above GOP +4.1% versus 2.3% revenue growth; insurance +17.4%, property taxes +4.3%; labor cost +22.1% versus 2019 for 7.4% fewer hours; hotel cap rates ~7.3%–8.1% by mid-2025.
  6. HVS, 2025 U.S. Hotel Development Cost Survey (reflecting 2024 budgets) and Hotel Valuation Techniques: median cost per key by segment (limited-service ~$167,000; select-service ~$223,000; full-service ~$409,000; luxury over $1,057,000; all-type median ~$219,000); the going-concern income approach; an FF&E reserve of 3%–5% of revenue; Luigi Major on the luxury cost-versus-ADR arithmetic; supply forecast ~0.8% for 2025–2026.
  7. Highland Group, Q4 2025 U.S. Extended-Stay Lodging report (with Lodging Econometrics Q3 2025 pipeline): extended-stay occupancy 71.3%, ~14 ppt above the overall industry; extended-stay ~40% of the construction pipeline by projects; segment supply growth accelerating to 5.1% in Q4 2025.
  8. Trepp, December 2025 CMBS delinquency (via Commercial Property Executive): lodging delinquency rose to 6.61% (+44 bps, the largest monthly jump of the major sectors) against an overall CMBS rate of 7.30%; Thomas Taylor commentary; 2021–2022 and 2016–2017 loan maturities driving 2026 issuance.
  9. STR (2019 Hotel Data Conference) and Cornell University / ISHC (John O'Neill): new-construction hotels reach a 100% RevPAR index around month 17, with an occupancy index near 58% in month one; an average occupancy build-up of ~3 years (3.08 years; 61.9% stabilizing within that window), top-25 markets faster (3.03 years) than smaller markets (3.36 years); brand-managed hotels ramp faster than independents.
  10. U.S. Small Business Administration, SOP 50 10 8 (effective June 1, 2025) and Congressional Research Service (IN12549): hotels as special-purpose going concerns requiring third-party feasibility; 15% equity (20% if a startup); SBA Franchise Directory reinstatement; owner-occupancy met by owner-operation; typical ~1.15x–1.25x minimum DSCR; a record 7(a) volume of $37.3 billion in FY2025 (SBA, September 30, 2025).
  11. USDA Rural Development, Business & Industry (B&I) Guaranteed Loan Program under the OneRD Guarantee Loan Initiative: hotels, motels, bed and breakfasts, and resorts explicitly eligible; loans up to $25 million; guarantees of 80% (≤$5M), 70% ($5M–$10M), and 60% (>$10M); rural defined as population ≤50,000; ~$4 billion of accommodation-and-food-services B&I financing 2015–2024.
  12. CoStar / Tourism Economics, final 2025 forecast revision (November 2025): 2026 RevPAR +0.5%, ADR +0.9%, occupancy ~62%, with a FIFA World Cup lift of roughly 40 basis points; Amanda Hite on ADR growing below inflation; an April 2026 rebound (occupancy 64.9%, ADR $165.90, RevPAR $107.73; CoStar, June 2026). Forecast, not actual.
  13. CBRE data via Bay Street Hospitality: late-2025 hospitality debt ~7.11% versus cap rates ~8.17%, restoring ~106 bps of positive leverage; the hotel cap-rate spread to the 10-year Treasury compressing to 2.44% in Q1 2024; luxury RevPAR +7.8% YoY in Q1 2026.
  14. STR/CoStar chain-scale and service-model detail via MMCG analysis: combined luxury and upper-upscale TTM occupancy 67.1%, RevPAR ~$186; economy and midscale tiers (~2.02 million rooms) occupancy 54.4%, ADR ~$86, RevPAR ~$47; limited-service GOP margins ~45%–55%, EBITDA ~35%–45%; the competitive-set RevPAR index (penetration / fair share). Proprietary single-provider; treated as indicative.
  15. Knowland/Amadeus and AHLA / Kalibri Labs: group demand in the top 25 markets recovered 99.1% of 2019 by Q3 2023; leisure ~605 million and business ~439 million room nights at end-2023 (6.5% and 8.2% below 2019); Q1 2025 group RevPAR +7.3% with group ADR +4.5%.
  16. AHLA and Hireology, Front Desk Feedback survey (December 6, 2024–January 3, 2025; 282 hoteliers): 65% of hotels reported staffing shortages, 9% severely understaffed; Rosanna Maietta noting hotel employment nearly 10% below pre-pandemic levels (AHLA, February 20, 2026).
  17. CBRE Research and Highland Group: economy extended-stay departmental labor ~$9.31 per occupied room versus $20.34 for traditional; economy and midscale hotel cap rates 8.6%–13.1% for the 12 months ending October 2025 (CoStar); PIP capex context (~$8,000–$50,000 per room by tier).
  18. PeerSense and HVS: conventional hotel financing at 65%–75% LTV with 25%–35% sponsor equity, often recourse; construction debt the hardest to obtain, requiring more equity and conservative underwriting; bridge and hard-money used to acquire, reposition, re-flag, and complete a PIP before refinancing into permanent debt.