Feasibility Study Company Independent Feasibility Analysis

Automobile Dealerships · Asset Class

Automobile Dealership Feasibility & Market Studies

Independent, lender-grade analysis for automobile dealerships across floor-plan, blue-sky and acquisition, SBA 504, conventional real-estate, net-lease, and subprime-finance capital. This page is our standing read on why the floor-plan lien defines every dealership credit, how blue-sky and fixed-operations absorption forecasts fail review, and the difference between the market study, the feasibility study, and the appraisal a dealership file requires.

Request a methodology briefing Jump to the blue-sky monitor
$1.3T
2025 franchised dealership sales, 16.2M units1
$2,247
2024 average gross per new vehicle, down 33%2
458
Record dealership buy-sell transactions in 20254
115%
NADA fixed-ops absorption target; industry near 64%9
The Dealership Thesis

The brand sets the value. The floor-plan lien sets the risk.

An automobile dealership is underwritten as an operating business, not as real estate, and its value is component-additive: blue sky, plus real estate valued separately, plus inventory, plus fixed assets. The defining lender fact is the floor-plan lien. A dealership's most valuable current asset, its vehicle inventory, is financed by a floor-plan lender, an OEM captive or a commercial bank, holding a first-priority lien on that inventory. Every other lender to the store, whether a real-estate, SBA, or working-capital lender, is structurally subordinate on inventory, and the floor-plan lender can pull the line and end the business.11 We prepare the market study, the feasibility study, and the appraisal input a dealership file needs, aligned to the standard that will judge it.

The economics have normalized sharply. Average gross profit per new vehicle fell 33.0 percent in 2024 to $2,247 as the 2021–2022 chip-shortage windfall ended.2 The durable profit now comes from parts and service (fixed ops), finance and insurance (F&I), and used vehicles, not from new-car volume. Fixed operations delivers roughly half of total dealership gross profit on ten to fifteen percent of revenue, and the fixed-operations absorption rate is the single most important dealership KPI.8 Floor-plan interest, meanwhile, swung from a near-zero credit to a major expense, estimated at roughly $70,000 per month for the average dealer, an eight-hundred-percent increase since 2020.6

The brand drives everything else. Blue-sky multiples range from roughly 8 to 10 times adjusted pre-tax earnings for Porsche and Lexus down to 3 to 4 times, or near zero, for Nissan and Stellantis.3 A Toyota store and a Stellantis store in the same market are entirely different businesses. What follows is a working desk: a brand blue-sky and regional monitor, the floor-plan and absorption failure forensics that sink dealership studies, the capital-source routing that decides which deliverable a project needs, and the study-type distinctions competitors state loosely. Every figure is dated and attributed in the sources below.

The Blue-Sky & Brand Monitor

Where dealership value stands, brand by brand.

A blue-sky read for the major franchise brands, refreshed from named national buy-sell sources. Sorted from premium to challenged. Multiples are national averages of adjusted pre-tax earnings; individual stores transact above or below the range on throughput, market, and facility.

The national picture frames every store. NADA counted 16,990 franchised light-vehicle dealers in 2025, 16.2 million new units, and total franchised sales above $1.3 trillion.1 The channel is large, high-revenue, and thin-margin, and it is consolidating: the Automotive News top-150 groups controlled about 26.6 percent of the nation's franchised rooftops in 2024, up from 25.3 percent, though the six public groups still sell only about seven percent of US new light vehicles.13 The buy-sell market set records in 2025, with Kerrigan Advisors recording 458 transactions representing 688 franchises sold, and Haig Partners counting 616 dealerships bought or sold; the Kerrigan Blue Sky Index closed the year at 176, seventy-six percent above 2019, and rose to 178 in the first quarter of 2026.43

Buyer demand: Premium Steady Challenged. Multiples are national averages of adjusted pre-tax earnings; blue sky is separate from real estate and inventory.
Franchise brand Blue-sky multiple Tier 2025 trend Buyer demand
Porsche8.0–10.0xUltra-luxuryLow end cut to 8.0x (Q3)Premium
Lexus9.0–10.0xLuxury importRaised (Q3), record valuesPremium
BMW7.5–9.0xLuxury importStablePremium
Mercedes-Benz7.25–8.75xLuxury importRaised on ROFR removal (Q4)Premium
Toyota6.75–8.5xImport volumeLow end raised to 6.75x (Q2)Premium
Honda6.0–7.0xImport volumeStablePremium
Subaru5.5–6.5xImportStableSteady
Kia4.5–5.5xImport valueStableSteady
Audi4.0–5.0xLuxury importCut (Q2)Steady
Chevrolet3.75–4.75xDomesticRaised (Q4), US-mfg biasSteady
Ford3.5–4.5xDomesticRaised (Q4)Steady
Buick-GMC3.5–4.5xDomesticRaised (Q4)Steady
Cadillac3.25–4.25xDomestic luxuryStableSteady
Nissan3.0–4.0xChallenged importTurnaround thesis buyersChallenged
Volkswagen3.0–4.0xImportStableChallenged
Volvo3.0–4.0xImportStableChallenged
Stellantis (CDJR)3.0–4.0xChallenged domesticVolatile, brand-fortune drivenChallenged

Brand multiples compiled from Haig Partners' Haig Report (Q1–Q3 2025 basis) and Kerrigan Advisors, with cross-checks to Mercer Capital; see sources 3, 4, and 5. The most recent fully text-verifiable Haig by-brand table is Q1 2025 (unchanged from Q4 2024); Q2–Q4 2025 moves are published as narrative deltas. Lincoln and Infiniti are quoted as dollar-value ranges rather than multiples. Treat ranges as guideposts, not appraisals.

The department-gross distinction is the most dangerous confusion

No error in this sector is more common than conflating the four gross-profit pools. New-vehicle gross is high-revenue and low, volatile margin: it fell 33.0 percent in 2024 to $2,247, with brand dispersion enormous, luxury averaging $5,679 per new unit, domestic $1,952, import $1,699.2 Used-vehicle front-end gross averaged around $1,400 in 2024.2 F&I is the high-margin back end, running roughly $2,500 to $2,534 gross per vehicle retailed at public dealers through 2025 and generating an estimated thirty to fifty percent of total dealership profit.3 Fixed operations, parts and service, is the highest-margin and most stable center. Never conflate new, used, F&I, and fixed-ops gross, and never conflate front-end with back-end gross; any pro forma that blends them is not defensible.

The absorption rate is the KPI a lender should demand

Service, or fixed-operations, absorption equals total fixed-operations gross profit divided by total dealership overhead. A one-hundred-percent absorption store covers all overhead on parts and service alone, making every vehicle sale incremental profit. NADA's published target is 115 percent, but the realized industry average runs far lower: Optimum reported dealership service absorption of 66.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024, and one reading of NADA data put the late-2025 national average near 64 percent.97 Cox Automotive's 2026 Fixed Operations study put average dealer fixed-ops revenue at $9.23 million in 2025, 13.2 percent of total dealership income, even as the dealership share of service visits fell from thirty-three to twenty-nine percent.8 A low absorption rate is a structural-fragility flag regardless of sales volume.

Floor-plan interest and the rate whipsaw

Floor plan is a revolving line secured by a first-priority lien on inventory, advancing roughly 95 to 100 percent of invoice, with curtailment provisions requiring scheduled principal paydowns on aging units and physical floor checks verifying every VIN.12 The interest is variable and rate-sensitive. It swung from near-zero, when NADA found dealerships averaged a $108,395 floor-plan profit in 2020, to a major cost: WardsAuto estimated the current average dealer floor-plan expense at roughly $70,000 per month, and Optimum reported net floor-plan expense per new vehicle surging 129 percent year over year to $395 in the fourth quarter of 2024 as days-supply lengthened.67 A model built on near-zero floor-plan interest breaks in a higher-rate environment.

The forward risks: EV service, cyclicality, and subprime

Three risks sit over every dealership model. The EV transition is the single most important long-term durability question and is genuinely contested: electric vehicles need less routine service, and some European dealers report service-revenue declines up to thirty percent at roughly twenty-eight percent EV penetration, while the counter-case notes EVs still need tires, suspension, and cabin systems and that the US fleet averages 12.6 years old and remains overwhelmingly gasoline for decades.22 Several OEMs mandated EV-readiness capital, from roughly $200,000 per store for Cadillac charging equipment, then offered buyouts that stranded dealer investment.21 Discretionary segments amplify cyclicality: RV retail fell 43.2 percent over three years from the 2021 peak, and a demand collapse against floored inventory is the danger scenario.23 And the independent used and buy-here-pay-here channels, larger by count and lower in credit quality, must be underwritten as subprime consumer-finance operations, not as retailers.10

The regional read: brand first, then market
Dealership value is driven first by the brand, then by the market and its franchise-law regime. Cells are directional, not a substitute for a market-level study.3
Market typeHighest-value brandsDemand & franchise-law readOpportunity
Sun Belt high-growth (Atlanta, Raleigh, Tampa, Dallas, Phoenix)Toyota/Lexus 6.75–10x; BMW/Mercedes 7.25–9xStrong registration growth, high truck/SUV mix; dealer-protective, Texas bars direct salesHigh opportunity
Mature coastal / high-barrier (CA, NY metro, New England)Porsche 8–10x; Lexus 9–10xHigh income and luxury/F&I; strong franchise statutes; CA retail cap rates lowest (~5.34%)Premium supply
Midwest / domestic-heavyChevrolet 3.75–4.75x; Ford 3.5–4.5x; Buick-GMC 3.5–4.5xTruck/SUV skew, steady growth; strong dealer statutes; US-manufacturing tailwindRising
Challenged-brand exposure (any region)Stellantis / Nissan / Infiniti 3–4xBrand-fortune dependent, volatile; same statutory protection, weaker blue-sky floorElevated risk
Direct-to-consumer contestedN/A (new EV entrants, not incumbents)Tesla direct in most states; Rivian/Lucid expanding (WA 2026); Ohio, Texas restrictiveInsulated

Regional reads compiled from Haig and Kerrigan brand data and Avison Young net-lease cap rates; see sources 3, 4, and 20. Metro-level registration, income, and intrabrand-density figures are not uniformly published in open sources and should be pulled from a market-level study (S&P Global Mobility registrations, Cox Automotive, Census).

Common Review Failures

How dealership underwriting fails review.

Floor-plan priority, department mix, and blue-sky earnings are the variables a credit committee scrutinizes most, and the places dealership studies most often break. Each failure below is tied to a real mechanism or number.

  1. Floor-plan lien-priority failure

    The number-one non-obvious failure: extending credit without recognizing the floor-plan lender's first lien on inventory and one's own structural subordination, with no intercreditor agreement and no accounting for the floor-plan lender's ability to pull the line and end the business. The sold-out-of-trust fraud risk goes unassessed.11

  2. OEM-approval, ROFR, and facility-mandate failure

    Underwriting a buy-sell that cannot close without factory approval, ignoring the 60-to-120-plus-day timeline, the right of first refusal that lets the OEM step into the deal on identical terms, or a facility-image upgrade condition that can be a multi-million-dollar contingent liability triggered at transfer.14

  3. Absorption-rate and department-mix mis-analysis

    The number-one analytical failure: underwriting to new-vehicle volume and revenue rather than to fixed-operations absorption and F&I and used gross. A low-absorption store is structurally fragile regardless of top-line volume, and the industry average of roughly 64 to 66 percent sits far below the NADA 115 percent target.9

  4. Earnings-normalization failure

    Underwriting to the anomalous 2021–2022 chip-shortage earnings, unrepeatable, rather than normalized earnings, then applying a blue-sky multiple to inflated earnings. New-vehicle gross has since fallen 33 percent to $2,247; a recent, expensive, and recurring error.2

  5. Blue-sky over-payment and brand-risk failure

    Paying a high multiple for a challenged brand whose franchise value can collapse with the brand's fortunes. Stellantis, Nissan, and Infiniti trade at 3 to 4 times or near-zero blue sky; a premium multiple there requires a documented turnaround thesis.3

  6. Floor-plan-interest rate-sensitivity failure

    A model built on near-zero floor-plan interest breaks in a higher-rate environment. Net floor-plan expense per new vehicle rose 129 percent year over year to $395 in the fourth quarter of 2024; stress the rate to current and plus 200 basis points and confirm coverage.7

  7. BHPH and subprime-finance failure

    Underwriting a buy-here-pay-here operation as a retailer rather than as a subprime consumer-finance company, and failing to analyze the loan portfolio (yield, default and repossession, Collateral Recovery Rate, static-pool). The Tricolor Holdings Chapter 7 collapse and the alleged double-pledged-collateral fraud is the cautionary case.19

  8. Real-estate, environmental, and going-dark failure

    Treating a specialized, purpose-built dealership facility as easily re-tenantable, and skipping the environmental diligence. Service bays, body-shop paint booths, solvents, and USTs make dealerships a higher-environmental-risk property type, so Phase I, and often Phase II, ESA is a material item.24

Capital-Source Routing

Which channel funds the store, and what it requires.

A dealership transaction routes through several capital sources at once, each with its own collateral, deliverable, and priority. The study is built to the union of requirements across the channels actually in play.

The dealership capital matrix
Collateral, deliverable, and fit by capital source. Figures are market conventions, not universal minimums.18
Capital sourceCollateral / deliverableFit & convention
OEM captive / bank floor planRevolving line, first lien on inventory95–100% of invoice; curtailments; floor checks
Blue-sky / acquisition financeDealer-services group underwriting on goodwillMultiple of adjusted pre-tax earnings, by brand
SBA 504Owner-occupied dealership real estate (fixed assets)Up to $5.5M debenture; TNW < $20M
SBA 7(a)Smaller independent used / service / body shopNet worth < $8.5M, avg net income < $3M
CRE propco / net-lease / sale-leasebackReal estate valued separately (buy-or-lease)Automotive net-lease cap ~6.2% (late 2024)
BHPH / related-finance-companySubprime-auto ABS, warehouse linesPortfolio-based; underwrite as a finance company

Sources: SBA SOP 50 10 8 size standards; OCC and FDIC floor-plan guidance; Avison Young net-lease cap rates. See sources 11, 18, 20.

One eligibility trap is worth stating plainly, because borrowers hit it constantly: the SBA is a limited fit for franchised new-car dealerships. Most franchised stores far exceed the modest 7(a) size standard for auto dealers, and the floor-plan lender's first lien on inventory subordinates any SBA lender on the most valuable current asset. The SBA also does not participate in ordinary floor-plan lending; a 2009–2010 Dealer Floor Plan pilot ran through September 30, 2010 and was not made permanent.18 Where the SBA does fit, an SBA 504 loan can finance the owner-occupied dealership real estate, and an SBA 7(a) loan can finance smaller independent used-car dealers or service-only, body-shop, and ancillary businesses, all under SOP 50 10 8 (effective June 1, 2025, with revisions effective September 30, 2025), including the rule that businesses with any non-US-citizen ownership are ineligible.18 Do not overstate the SBA's role in dealership finance.

  • Franchised new-car acquisition (buy-sell)Blue-sky and acquisition finance via a dealer-services bank, OEM captive, or seller financing; contingent on factory approval and the ROFR window.
  • Owner-occupied dealership real estateSBA 504 or conventional CRE; often held in a separate propco with a buy-or-lease or sale-leaseback option.
  • Smaller independent used-car or service and body shopSBA 7(a) where the size standard fits; independent floor plan (NextGear, Westlake, AFC) for used inventory.
  • Vehicle inventoryOEM captive or bank floor plan, first-lien, with curtailment schedule and physical floor checks.
  • Buy-here-pay-here operationUnderwrite the related-finance-company loan portfolio as a finance company (ABS, warehouse), not as a retailer.
Study Types

Market study, feasibility study, appraisal: three questions.

These three documents answer different questions and are not substitutes. Lenders and borrowers conflate them constantly, and in dealerships the trap is deeper because value is component-additive and the going concern is not the real estate.

What each document answers, and the standard that governs it.
DocumentQuestion answeredGoverning standard
AppraisalWhat is it worth? A value opinion, and going-concern value must never be conflated with real-estate-only value.USPAP
Market studyWill it sell? Registrations, demographics, income, competition, and allocation, without the site-specific financial model.Market-demand analysis, brand-specific
Feasibility studyWill it sell and cover its debt? The market study plus the pro forma, DSCR, and viability conclusion for a specific store.Lender underwriting

The dealership going-concern, or business-enterprise, value is component-additive and must be stated precisely: blue sky (a multiple of adjusted pre-tax earnings, by brand) plus real estate (valued separately, often in a propco, at market, with a buy-or-lease option) plus inventory (new vehicles at floor-plan payoff, used at wholesale or appraised, parts at cost with an obsolescence adjustment) plus fixed assets and FF&E (appraised). Blue-sky adjustments normalize owner compensation, rent to market, one-time items, and LIFO. The franchise and blue sky are intangible; the real estate carries a going-dark and re-tenanting question that a specialized, purpose-built facility makes acute.24

Two structural questions sit on top of the model. First, the OEM franchise agreement is both the most valuable asset and the tightest constraint: state dealer-franchise laws, anchored by the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act of 1956, give blue sky its legal foundation, while factory approval, the ROFR, facility mandates, and vehicle allocation govern every transaction.15 The direct-to-consumer fight, with Rivian suing the Ohio BMV in 2025 and Washington's SB 6354 extending direct sales to Rivian and Lucid in 2026, is a genuine, unresolved, state-by-state policy dispute.16 Second, F&I compliance is a live matter: the FTC's CARS Rule was vacated on procedural grounds by the Fifth Circuit in January 2025, but existing UDAP law and state activity, such as California SB 766, persist, so continued enforcement should be expected.17

Dealership sub-segments, each with a distinct study scope

Dealership Questions

Automobile dealership feasibility and market-study questions.

What is the difference between a dealership market study and a feasibility study?

In dealership finance the two are related but distinct. A market study sizes demand: new-vehicle registrations, area-of-responsibility demographics, income, truck and SUV mix, and intrabrand competitive density. A feasibility study tests whether a specific store, at a specific location, under specific ownership, can generate enough cash flow to service its debt and clear return thresholds, adding the pro forma, debt-service coverage, and a viability conclusion. An appraisal is a third document that opines on value. Because dealership value is driven first by the brand franchise, the market study must be brand-specific before any feasibility conclusion is drawn.

What is dealership blue sky and how is it valued?

Blue sky is dealership goodwill, quoted as a multiple of adjusted pre-tax earnings, where adjustments normalize owner compensation, rent to market, one-time items, and LIFO. It is valued separately from real estate and inventory. The going-concern value is component-additive: blue sky, plus real estate at market, plus new inventory at floor-plan payoff, used inventory at wholesale, and parts at cost less obsolescence, plus fixed assets at appraised value. Multiples vary enormously by brand, from roughly 8 to 10 times for Porsche and Lexus down to 3 to 4 times for Nissan and Stellantis.

Why is the floor-plan lien so important to a dealership lender?

A dealership's most valuable current asset, its vehicle inventory, is financed by a floor-plan lender, either an OEM captive or a commercial bank, that holds a first-priority lien on that inventory and advances roughly 95 to 100 percent of invoice. Every other lender to the dealership, whether a real-estate, SBA, or working-capital lender, is structurally subordinate on inventory, and the floor-plan lender can freeze the line and end the business. Sold-out-of-trust, where a dealer sells a floored unit and diverts the payoff, is the classic dealership fraud and the reason floor checks and curtailment schedules exist.

What is the fixed-operations absorption rate, and why does it matter?

Service, or fixed-operations, absorption equals total fixed-operations gross profit divided by total dealership overhead. A 100 percent absorption store covers all overhead on parts and service alone, making every vehicle sale incremental profit. NADA's published target is 115 percent, while the realized industry average runs far lower, roughly 64 to 66 percent. Because new-vehicle gross has normalized sharply, the durable profit comes from fixed operations, F&I, and used vehicles, so a low absorption rate is a structural-fragility flag regardless of sales volume, and it is the single metric a lender should demand.

Can an automobile dealership be financed with an SBA loan?

Only in limited cases. The SBA is a poor fit for most franchised new-car dealerships: the size standards are modest, most franchised stores exceed them, and the floor-plan lender's first lien on inventory subordinates any SBA lender on the most valuable asset. The SBA also does not participate in ordinary floor-plan lending; its Dealer Floor Plan pilot expired in 2010 and was not made permanent. Where the SBA does fit: a 504 loan can finance owner-occupied dealership real estate, and a 7(a) loan can finance smaller independent used-car dealers or service and body-shop businesses, subject to SOP 50 10 8 eligibility.

Which franchise brands command the highest blue-sky multiples?

Porsche and Lexus command the highest national-average multiples, roughly 8 to 10 times adjusted pre-tax earnings, followed by BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, and Honda. Domestic brands such as Chevrolet, Ford, and Buick-GMC run lower, roughly 3.5 to 4.75 times, and challenged brands including Stellantis (Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep-Ram), Nissan, and Infiniti trade at low or near-zero blue sky. A Toyota store and a Stellantis store in the same market are entirely different businesses, which is why a dealership study must be brand-specific.

How does the EV transition affect dealership feasibility?

It is the single most important long-term durability question, and the evidence is genuinely mixed. The bear case is that electric vehicles need no oil changes, fewer wear parts, and less braking service, threatening the fixed-operations profit engine, with some European dealers reporting service-revenue declines at higher EV penetration. The counter case is that EVs still need tires, suspension, and cabin and 12-volt systems, that battery and software service create new revenue, and that the U.S. fleet averages more than twelve years old and remains overwhelmingly gasoline for decades. Several OEMs also mandated EV-readiness capital and later walked it back, stranding dealer investment. A feasibility model should present this as unresolved.

By Market

Automobile dealership feasibility studies by state.

Dealership demand and value are local, and the state dealer-franchise law and direct-to-consumer regime shape blue sky directly. Explore the state markets where registrations, brand allocation, and the regulatory layer determine whether a store pencils.

Underwriting a dealership acquisition? Start with the brand and the floor plan.

Feasibility Study Company prepares independent Auto Dealership feasibility and market studies, built to the review standard your capital source applies. A methodology briefing walks through the analytical framework, the deliverable your capital source requires, and the current blue-sky, absorption, and floor-plan data for your brand and market.

Request a methodology briefing
Sources

Data sources and dates.

Every figure on this page traces to a named authority. Dealership readings are point-in-time and provider-dependent; department-gross, blue-sky, and going-concern figures differ by basis and must not be compared across incompatible bases, as noted.

  1. NADA, NADA Data 2024 and NADA Data 2025: franchised dealer counts, new-unit sales, total franchised sales, and service-and-parts sales (the 2025 service-parts figure reflects a revised basis and is not straight-line comparable to 2024).
  2. Presidio-NCM Average Dealership Performance Benchmark, full-year 2024 (via Digital Dealer, January 2025): gross per new vehicle retailed (down 33.0% to $2,247), brand dispersion, used front-end gross, and revenue per store.
  3. Haig Partners, The Haig Report (Q1 2025 through Q3 2025): national-average blue-sky multiples by brand, F&I gross per vehicle retailed, and dealerships bought or sold (616 in 2025).
  4. Kerrigan Advisors, The Blue Sky Report and Kerrigan Blue Sky Index (2025 Annual and Q1 2026): 458 transactions and 688 franchises in 2025, average public-dealer pre-tax profit, blended multiple (~6.3x), and Index (176 year-end 2025, 178 Q1 2026).
  5. Mercer Capital, dealership-valuation commentary (2025): fixed-operations share of total gross profit and Haig-versus-Kerrigan multiple comparisons.
  6. WardsAuto (2024): average dealer floor-plan expense magnitude (~$70,000 per month, an 800% increase since 2020), contrasted with NADA's 2020 floor-plan profit of $108,395 and 2018 cost of $55,164.
  7. Optimum dealership benchmarking (Q4 2024): service absorption of 66.3%, net floor-plan expense per new vehicle up 129% YoY to $395, and return-on-sales near 2.1%.
  8. Cox Automotive, 2026 Fixed Operations study: average dealer fixed-ops revenue of $9.23 million in 2025, 13.2% of total dealership income, and dealership service-visit share falling from 33% to 29%; fixed-ops share of gross via NADA/Edmunds.
  9. NADA Slide Guide: published fixed-operations absorption target of 115%, against an industry average of roughly 64–66%.
  10. NIADA and NIADA/Experian (2024): independent used-vehicle units (more than 12.75 million in 2023), average used interest rate (~11.9%), term, and days-supply; buy-here-pay-here interest and default metrics via NABD.
  11. OCC, Comptroller's Handbook (Floor Plan Lending), and FDIC Floor Plan Lending Core Analysis Procedures: first-lien priority, out-of-trust warning signs, and the intercreditor reality for subordinate lenders.
  12. LegalClarity and Crestmont Capital: floor-plan advance rates (95–100% of invoice), curtailment mechanics (10–20% paydowns beginning 30–90 days after flooring), and sold-out-of-trust consequences.
  13. Automotive News, top-150 dealership groups (2024): 18,311 franchised rooftops and consolidation share (26.6%, up from 25.3%); Morningstar (public-group and top-10 share of new light-vehicle sales).
  14. Acquisition Stars and Fox Rothschild / Franchise Law Journal: buy-sell factory-approval timeline (60–120+ days), application requirements, and right-of-first-refusal windows (typically 15–45 days).
  15. Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act (ADDCA, 1956) and state dealer-franchise statutes: constraints on termination, transfer denial, coerced facility upgrades, and same-brand add-points, the legal foundation of blue-sky value.
  16. Rivian v. Ohio BMV (August 2025) and Washington SB 6354 (March 2026): the direct-to-consumer policy dispute; positions of NADA and the Alliance for Automotive Innovation.
  17. FTC Combating Auto Retail Scams (CARS) Rule (finalized January 2024); Fifth Circuit, NADA v. FTC (January 27, 2025 vacatur on procedural grounds); California SB 766 (introduced February 2025) and continuing state activity.
  18. U.S. Small Business Administration: 7(a) and 504 size standards for auto dealers, SBA 504 debenture and net-worth limits, SOP 50 10 8 (effective June 1, 2025; revised September 30, 2025), and the Dealer Floor Plan pilot (expired September 30, 2010).
  19. Tricolor Holdings Chapter 7 (September 2025) and SDNY indictment, U.S. v. Daniel Chu, No. 25-cr-579 (December 2025): the alleged double-pledged-collateral fraud (~$800M "bogus") and disclosed bank losses above $340M (CNBC, DOJ SDNY).
  20. Avison Young (late 2024): automotive net-lease cap rates (~6.2% auto vs ~6.28% all net lease) and California retail cap rate (~5.34%); dealership assets trade at a modest premium for cyclicality and specialization.
  21. Edmunds, Fox Business, and Green Car Reports: Cadillac's ~$200,000-per-store EV-readiness capex and 2020 buyout (~150 of 880 dealers), GM's Buick buyouts (2023–2024), and Ford's Model e certification program.
  22. Forbes India (industry executives): European EV service-revenue declines up to 30% at ~28% EV penetration; U.S. fleet average age of 12.6 years (2024) as the counterweight.
  23. RV Industry Association (RVIA) and RVBS; Marine Products Corp, Malibu Boats, THOR Industries, and Patrick Industries (10-K/8-K filings): RV retail down 43.2% over three years from the 2021 peak and marine and RV inventory reductions under elevated floor-plan costs.
  24. Net-lease and dealership real-estate research (Investment Grade; CBRE Dealership Capital, formerly Capital Automotive): purpose-built facility size and specialization, the going-dark and re-tenanting question, and Phase I/II environmental diligence.